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Abstract
Ranked choice voting (RCV) has become increasing popular in the United States as more cities and states begin allowing
voters to rank candidates in order of preference. This change in election system has been linked to increased campaign
civility and mobilization, but with little evidence suggesting these benefits lead to increased voter turnout in the general
population. This study argues that RCV electionsmay not increase overall voting but will increase youth voting. Considering
young Americans, who have become increasingly pessimistic towards politics and are also heavily reliant on mobilization
for participation, this study argues that increased campaign civility and mobilization may work to offset the negative feel‐
ings and lack of political engagement that plague young Americans. Using amatched study of individual level voter turnout
for seven RCV and fourteen non‐RCV local elections from 2013 and 2014, we find that there is no statistical difference in
voting rates between RCV and plurality cities for the general public. Yet, in line with our hypotheses, younger voters are
more likely to vote in RCV cities. Further, we find that increased contact in RCV elections accounts for a larger portion of the
increased voter turnout compared to perceptions of campaign civility. Findings suggest RCV acts as a positive mobilizing
force for youth voting through increasing campaign contact.
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1. Introduction
United States federalism gives wide latitude to state and
local governments for the administration of their elec‐
tions. Because of this, the structure of elections can
vary drastically across states, counties, and even cities.
One such variation is whether elections are conducted
under plurality, majority, or preferential voting rules.
Most elections conducted in the United States oper‐
ate under plurality or majority rules. For plurality elec‐
tions, the candidate with the most votes wins. In major‐
ity elections, candidates must be awarded a majority of
the votes cast in a single round. If no candidate meets
the threshold, runoff elections are held at a later date,
in which the top two candidates compete for a simple
majority of votes. Preferential voting systems, on the
other hand, require the winner receive a majority of
votes while not requiring follow up elections. Instead,
voters rank candidates for a single office in order of
preference at a single time at the voting booth. If no
candidate receives a majority, the least popular can‐
didate is eliminated, and all votes cast for that candi‐
date automatically go to the respective voter’s second
choice (cf. Grofman & Feld, 2004). This continues until
a candidate receives a majority of the votes cast in
a round.
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Preferential voting systems have been gaining pop‐
ularity in recent years, including in the United States
(Fortin, 2020), as more US cities and states reform their
elections to incorporate systems such as ranked choice
voting (RCV). In 2018, Maine used RCV for the first time
for midterm elections. Yet, Maine is just one example
of RCV in the United States. Five states used RCV for
their Democratic primary, six use RCV for overseas vot‐
ers, and several large cities utilize RCV for local elec‐
tions (e.g., San Francisco, CA; St. Paul, MN). According to
FairVote, a nonprofit, non‐partisan RCV advocacy organi‐
zation, approximately ten million voting age Americans
reside in jurisdictions that have adopted RCV, and nearly
four hundred RCV elections have been conducted as of
September 2020 (FairVote, 2020).
Despite the increased popularity of preferential elec‐
tions, few studies have investigated the effects of such
systems on voter turnout comparatively, and even less so
in the context of the United States. Previous studies have
found that US elections conducted under preferential
voting rules result in more civil campaigning (Donovan,
Tolbert, & Gracey, 2016) and greater campaign mobi‐
lization efforts (Bowler, Donovan, & Brockington, 2003;
Smith, 2016). However, only a handful of studies have
tested whether this leads to increased voting. Of those
that investigate turnout effects, most find no evidence of
increased turnout (e.g., McDaniel, 2016), though none
have investigated potentially differential affects based
on age. Yet, agemay be an important demographicworth
directly assessing when investigating the participatory
effects of preferential elections. Stark differences exist
in perceptions of politics and reliance on mobilization
efforts by age and generation, with younger, Millennial
(born 1981–1996), and Generation Z (1997–2012) voters
possessing more pessimistic political outlooks (Dermody
& Hanmer‐Lloyd, 2004; Lawless & Fox, 2015) and a larger
reliance on campaign outreach (Dalton, 2015) while less
likely to be contacted by campaigns (Nickerson, 2006;
Rosenstone & Hansen, 2003). Because of these factors,
it could be that the increased civility and mobilization
may be more beneficial for young voters than their older
counterparts. That is, preferential elections may offset
the pessimistic perceptions of politics among young vot‐
ers while increasing the chances of being contacted,
resulting in increased youth voter turnout.
This study proposes that institutional changes to the
electoral system as a result of replacing plurality and
majority elections with preferential electoral systems
should reduce the incivility of campaigns while increas‐
ing campaign contact. As such, switching to preferential
elections should increase the rates of political participa‐
tion among young voterswho are particularly disaffected
and less likely to be contacted by campaigns. To test
whether preferential elections increase youth turnout,
and whether increased civility or mobilization are key
mechanisms through which preferential elections do
so, we leverage the natural variation in electoral sys‐
tems across cities in the United States. We compare
voter turnout, perceptions of civility, and candidate con‐
tact efforts between preferential and plurality cities
matched on key demographics to determine the extent
towhich preferential elections increase youth voting and
whether civility or mobilization are key mechanisms of
that increased turnout.
The remainder of this study will proceed as follows:
First, we review the literature surrounding preferential
voting. Then we discuss who young voters are and why
we expect preferential voting to impact their voting
behavior, after which we form our hypotheses regard‐
ing the mechanisms and effects of preferential elections.
Data, method, and analyses follow. The article ends with
a summary of the results.
2. Preferential Voting Systems: Function and Effects
Most research on preferential voting draws from
European, African, and Asian politics, given the histori‐
cally limited use of the process in theUnited States. Reilly
(2002) uses case studies from ‘divided societies’ like
Papua New Guinea, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Estonia,
and Fiji and compares them to ‘non‐divided’ societies
like Australia, parts of Europe and North America. Reilly
finds preferential voting better represents the interests
of a larger amount of people and leads these interests
to becoming a part of major parties’ platforms more
often than plurality systems. In the context of divided
or disaffected societies that Reilly investigates, this is
an important electoral and democratic feature of pref‐
erential elections which allows those with less political
power to become more involved and have more influ‐
ence within the political process. By giving citizens the
chance to rank candidates in order of preference, prefer‐
ential voting may decrease the chances that one’s vote
becomes wasted, providing greater individual influence
in elections and satisfaction with the process. Reilly’s
results echoed those of Horowitz (2000) who finds politi‐
cal systems that allow voters to castmultiple preferences
promote bargaining, alliances, and inclusion among rival
political groups and political elites, leading to better citi‐
zen representation.
Farrell and McAllister (2006) assess the satisfaction
with democracy across 29 nations, mostly from west‐
ern Europe with the addition of Australia, New Zealand,
Taiwan, and the United States. Their survey results show
that preferential voting systems promote a greater sense
of fairness about the election and also increase the pub‐
lic’s satisfaction with the democratic system as a whole.
Farrell and McAllister (2006) also find that preferential
elections work to bring together diverse and divided
populations, create a more inclusive and cooperative
government and party system, and help increase the
public’s perceptions of external efficacy of their govern‐
ment; giving modern support to the theories outlined
by Reilly (2002) and Horowitz (2000). Greater campaign
civility and citizen perceptions of fairness in preferential
elections has also been observed at the local level in
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the United States. Donovan et al. (2016) and John and
Douglas (2017), find that voters in RCV cities rated cam‐
paigns as less negative, were more satisfied with cam‐
paign conduct, and perceived less criticizing between
the candidates (but see Nielson, 2017). Related, using
text analysis, a working paper by McGinn (2020) finds
that candidate debates are more civil with less negativ‐
ity under RCV elections. The theoretical story outlined in
these articles suggests that preferential voting systems
increase civility of campaigns, as candidates now have
an incentive to campaign for second and third place and
do so by actively not attacking their political opponents
or risk alienating their opponents’ supporters (see also
Drutman, 2020).
Not only has research shown RCV elections to be
more civil, but others have shown RCV candidates to
engage in more campaign outreach efforts in an attempt
to court new or non‐supportive voters and expand their
base. In support of this, Bowler et al. (2003) find that can‐
didates in preferential voting systems were more likely
to try to mobilize voters than those in plurality systems.
A report by FairVote shows that citizens of RCV juris‐
dictions were more likely to be contacted by a cam‐
paign, and this contact was also more likely to include
in‐person contact (Smith, 2016), the most effective form
of mobilization (Gerber & Green, 2000; Green, Gerber, &
Nickerson, 2003a).
Despite the increased mobilization and campaign
civility, few articles have demonstrated participatory
effects of preferential elections. A working paper by
McGinn (2020) suggests that preferential elections may
increase voter turnout. In their unpublished study of
RCV mobilization effects, Kimball and Anthony (2016)
show that RCV does not increase voting but does retain
voters between the primary and general elections. Still,
others have charged RCV with potentially decreasing
turnout or increasing the frequency of under/over votes.
Ranking multiple candidates is more difficult and cogni‐
tively demanding than selecting only a single preference
(Bowler & Farrell, 1995; Donovan et al., 2019; Kimball
& Kropf, 2016). As such, people may abstain from vot‐
ing or, when voting, accidentally over/under vote due
to not understanding the ranking process. Using sur‐
vey data, Donovan et al. (2019) find that voters in RCV
cities perceived greater difficulty with the voting pro‐
cess than did their counterparts in plurality cities, though
not by large margins. Burnett and Kogan (2015) use
ballots cast in four California RCV elections and find
that 8 to 12 percent of ballots marked the same candi‐
date multiple times. Looking at aggregate turnout data
in San Francisco mayoral elections from 1995 to 2011,
McDaniel (2016) finds that Black and white individuals
vote less in RCV elections.
The evidence presented thus far suggests that prefer‐
ential elections are more likely to result in the preferred
candidate being elected, aremore civil, have greater can‐
didate contact, but may not increase voting in the gen‐
eral public and potentially decrease voting for the certain
subgroups. Do these results to extend to youth voters?
Orwill the increased campaign civility and candidate con‐
tact under preferential elections increase youth turnout,
as we theorize?
3. Youth Participation and RVC
Scholars analyzing youth voter turnout in the United
States and comparatively have generally agreed that the
percentage of young individuals voting has been declin‐
ing. In studying the period between 1972 (the first year
that 18–20‐year‐olds could vote in the United States)
and 2002, Levine and Lopez (2002) find that American
youth participation in presidential elections declined in
the aggregate by 13 to 15 percentage points. Franklin
(2004) argues that lowering the voting age has had the
effect of decreasing generational voting across multi‐
ple advanced democracies. Related, Holbein and Hillygus
(2020, p.3) note that the turnout gap between genera‐
tions has widened over time, particularly in the United
States, with today’s youths less likely to become voters
compared to earlier generations. Confronted with low
youth turnout rates, many argue that that younger gen‐
erations abstain from voting due to being politically apa‐
thetic, lacking a sense of civic duty, being unaware of the
political process, and most damningly, are ignorant and
indifferent by choice (e.g., Putnam, 2000).
Other scholars argue today’s youths are not vot‐
ing at the same rates as older Americans or earlier
cohorts because of perceptions of the political system
being unresponsive or corrupt. The end of the 20th cen‐
tury gave rise to increased partisan loyalty and nega‐
tive media influence that paved the road for increased
polarization, Congressional gridlock, and negative par‐
tisanship (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016; Grossmann
& Hopkins, 2016; Mason, 2018). Related, trust in the
Government to do the right thing and approval of
Congress have been declining rapidly in past decades and
are at all‐time lows (Pew Research Center, 2019). These
stark change in political discourse, trust, and approval
directly coincide temporally with the years in which
Millennials began developing their political selves. This
has resulted in today’s youths maturing in an era of
intense political polarization, dysfunction, and negativity,
resulting in lower levels of political trust and efficacy that
has bled over into decreased voting.
Dermody and Hanmer‐Lloyd (2004) review evidence
of declining political participation among British youths
and determine that trust, distrust, and cynicism all fea‐
ture strongly in determining political engagement. They
advocate for youth targeted marketing campaigns that
help to increase trust and reduce distrust, which, they
argue, should increase the likelihood of youth voting.
In the United States, Lawless and Fox (2015) find that the
mean‐spirited and dysfunctional nature and portrayal
of the American political system has led to youths not
believing in the ability of elected officials or government
to be an effective entity for promoting positive change.
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Young people identified dishonesty, self‐centeredness,
being argumentative, and being only out for themselves
as themost commonnegative attributes about American
politicians. They also find that the youth feel alienated
from contemporary American politics. The authors sug‐
gest the prevalence of negative campaigning and lack of
civil discoursemay be especially destructive to youth par‐
ticipation in politics.
Not all scholars are satisfied with the conclusion that
younger citizens simply abstain from political participa‐
tion out of apathy or pessimism. Instead, others began
investigating alternative explanations for the youth’s
apparent apathy. Looking at participation more broadly
to include actions such as protesting and petition sign‐
ing, Dalton (2015) finds that younger members of the
electorate are participating, just doing so outside of the
institutionalized ways that older generations have partic‐
ipated. Dalton argues older citizens are more likely to be
‘duty‐based citizens,’ defined as one’s participation being
driven by a sense of needing to performbasic democratic
and civic duties, while today’s youths are more likely
to be ‘engaged citizens,’ whose participation is based
on activism, passion, and campaignmobilization (Dalton,
2008, 2015). Young people vote in elections not out of
duty, but when they are engaged by the issues, cam‐
paigns, or candidates (Dalton, 2015; LaCombe & Juelich,
2019; Lawless & Fox, 2015; Sloam, 2014). This could be
why mobilization and contact efforts can have such a
large influence on young voters (Green & Gerber, 2001),
and why youth turnout has declined as parties expend
less efforts attracting young voters or engaging with the
political issues that young voters support (Endres & Kelly,
2018; Green et al., 2003b). Because young voters are
less likely to vote, candidates and campaigns view them
as not worth mobilizing. Additionally, even if campaigns
wanted to contact youth voters, their increased mobil‐
ity and lower homeownership rates makes it more dif‐
ficult to do so (Nickerson, 2006; Rosenstone & Hansen,
2003). This literature agrees that the youth see the elec‐
toral process as corrupt, non‐responsive, and unproduc‐
tive, but add that, as a result they focus their civic ener‐
gies from voting to other means of participating absent
proper mobilization.
Still, other scholars have turned their focus from
internal feelings to political resources and external
institutions. Younger Americans have lower levels of
resources and voter habituation (Plutzer, 2002), and as
such, may be more susceptible to the influences of
changes in the electoral environment. In support of this
assertion, Holbein and Hillygus (2020) test the effects
of pre‐registration, same‐day registration, and other per‐
missive electoral reforms on youth turnout, finding that
young individuals are especially sensitive to changing
costs to vote and are more likely to vote when the voting
process, particularly registration, ismade easier (see also
Hanmer, 2009; Leighley & Nagler, 2013). Coming from
the opposite angle, Juelich and Coll (2020) use an index
of electoral reforms (Li, Pomante, & Schraufnagel, 2018)
to estimate the effect of more restrictive environments
on youth voting and find that younger Americans vote
less when electoral reforms are designed in more restric‐
tive ways. This third line of literature acknowledges
that young voters have lower efficacy and resources,
while demonstrating how altering the rules of the game
can alter the extent to which those barriers hinder
youth voting.
Although evidence for RCV turnout effects on the
general public is mixed, we hypothesize that RCV elec‐
tions should increase youth voting by decreasing the neg‐
ativity of elections and increasing candidate contact—
two issues that plague young voters more than their
older counterparts—and also because youth behavior is
influenced to a greater extent by changes in electoral
environments than that of older individuals.
In this article we will propose the following
hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: Younger voters in RCV cities will be
more likely to vote than younger voters in plurality
cities.
• Hypothesis 2: The effects of RCV will increase
younger voter propensities more than older voter
propensities.
• Hypothesis 3: Increased civility will account for
part of the increase in youth voter turnout in RCV
cities.
• Hypothesis 4: Increased mobilization will account
for part of the increase in youth voter turnout in
RCV cities.
To visually lay out our hypotheses, Figure 1 shows the
expected relationship between electoral systems, civility
and mobilization, and youth voter turnout. We expect
that preferential voting elections will lead to increased
campaign civility andmobilization, whichwill in turn lead
to increased youth voter turnout; while first‐past‐the‐
post elections will have less civility andmobilization, and
thus, lower youth turnout.
4. Data and Research Design
The data used in this study come from two surveys con‐
ducted immediately after the 2013 and 2014 November
elections in several US cities. Following both elections,
telephone interviews were conducted in English and
Spanish through random digit dialing via landlines and
cellphones by the Rutgers‐Eagleton Institute of Politics.
The survey was conducted on samples of registered vot‐
ers in both RCV and plurality cities in the United States.
Respondents were chosen randomly within each city,
not based on RCV‐plurality groupings (i.e., respondents
from one city are independently drawn from respon‐
dents in other cities). In each survey‐year, roughly 2,400
respondents were sampled for a total of roughly 4,800
respondents. Half of survey respondents reside in RCV
cities, the other half in plurality cities. The cities and
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Figure 1. Theoretical diagram.
their RCV/plurality designation can be seen in Table 1.
In parentheses beneath each city is the number of
respondents from that city, as well as the city’s popula‐
tion for comparability (for a more complete list of city
demographics, see the Supplementary File, Appendix C,
Table C3).
The chosen RCV cities represent some of the largest
local election districts that used RCV in the United States
(during the 2013–2014 elections, when data were col‐
lected), as well as some of the most frequently studied
RCV jurisdictions (e.g., Burnett & Kogan, 2015; Donovan
et al., 2016, 2019; McDaniel, 2016). To find compa‐
rable control cases, plurality cities were matched on
population size, racial and ethnic composition, politi‐
cal characteristics, US region, and socio‐economic condi‐
tions. Though there are undoubtedly some differences
between the treatment and control cities, we believe
that this approach can help mitigate concerns of non‐
comparability between treatment (RCV) and control (plu‐
rality) cities for three key reasons.
First, most RCV cities have multiple control cities,
allowing for greater leverage in the control group.
Second, with the exception of the two RCV cities in
Minnesota, all RCV cities are in the same state as their
plurality counterparts, with many in the same county.
Thoughbetween‐city differencesmay remain,most local‐
ities are operating under the same county and state
level influences (e.g., county and state level participa‐
tory culture, election resources and regulations). As such,
comparing voter turnout in RCV cities to plurality cities
matched on important characteristics and that are oper‐
ating in similar electoral environments helps control
Table 1. RCV cities and their plurality matches.
RCV Cities Matched Plurality Cities
Berkeley, CA Alameda, CA
(112, 116k) (101, 76k)
Cambridge, MA Lowell, MA Worcester, MA
(190, 107k) (99, 108k) (94, 119k)
Minneapolis, MN Boston, MA Seattle, WA Tulsa, OK
(790, 394k) (255, 640k) (249, 648k) (261, 396k)
Oakland, CA Anaheim, CA Santa Clara, CA Santa Ana, CA Stockton, CA
(670, 402k) (99, 343k) (144, 120k) (99, 331k) (109, 297k)
San Francisco, CA San Jose, CA
(149, 829k) (197, 986k)
San Leandro, CA Richmond, CA
(383, 87k) (338, 106k)
St. Paul, MN Cedar Rapids, IA Des Moines, IA
(196, 292k) (106, 128k) (90, 207k)
Total RCV:2,490 Total Plurality: 2,241 Grand Total:4,731
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for unobserved factors influencing turnout. Taking this
within‐country (and usually within‐state, if not within‐
county) approach provides a stronger set of control cases
and claim to causality than would taking a cross‐national
approach where treatment and control cases may differ
drastically on unobservable characteristics. Last, though
the type of preferential voting differs by city, the data
at hand do not allow us to differentiate by preferen‐
tial style. However, this should not be an issue for our
analyses, as increased civility and mobilization has been
found across different preferential election types (e.g.,
Donovan et al., 2016; John & Douglas, 2017; Kimball &
Kropf, 2016; McGinn, 2020; Smith, 2016). For brevity,
we use RCV to denote preferential cities and plurality to
denote plurality cities.
Using individual level data provides three advantages
over aggregate data for this study. First, studies using
aggregate data often assume that the presence of an
electoral reform being correlated with increased propor‐
tions of demographic group participation means that
individuals from that group are more likely to partici‐
pate due to that reform. However, inferring individual
behavior from aggregate patterns may result in an eco‐
logical fallacy; just because a group average may be
higher or lower than others does not conclude that ran‐
dom individuals in that group are more or less likely to
be affected. Second, using individual level data allows
us to further control for individual factors that may
affect whether someone decides to vote. When using
aggregate data, researchers cannot control for individ‐
ual differences in characteristics that may lead individ‐
uals of a demographic group to participate at different
rates than members of a different demographic group
or those in the same group. Third, being able to control
for individual level differences helpsmitigate concerns of
non‐comparability across treatment and control groups.
Comparing individual level voting behavior in cities cho‐
sen to control for aggregate level factors while also con‐
trolling for individual level factors helps mitigate con‐
cerns of non‐comparability across cases, even if the cities
chosen are not perfect control cases.
With that being said, there are a few limitations to
the data. First, the data is several years old at this point.
Thus, it is worth considering the extent to which these
findings can be generalized to today. Yet, it is still worth
documenting whether RCV affects youth voting behav‐
ior and why, particularly considering its rising popularity.
Second, the survey is of only registered voters and asks
respondents to self‐report voting. Potentially because of
this, average voter turnout in the sample is substantially
higher than would usually be expected, at 83 percent for
the full sample, 85 percent for RCV cities, and 82 percent
for plurality cities (p = 0.002). Turnout in these elections
typically ranged 33 to 45 percent. While this turnout is
substantially higher than expected, working with a sam‐
ple with such high self‐reported turnout may make find‐
ing any effects for RCV on youth voting more difficult
due to high turnout rates essentially ‘capping’ potential
effects. Thus, this higher‐than‐actual turnout may bias
against finding any evidence of RCV effects. Third, only
RCV cities from three states (California, Massachusetts,
and Minnesota) were used as treatment groups, with
the control groups intentionally being similar in politi‐
cal, demographic, and geographic features. Though the
city‐as‐cases approach is beneficial in controlling for
unobserved factors, it also limits the generalizability of
this study.
5. Results
First, to evaluate the effect of RCV on overall turnout,
we turn to Table 2. Table 2 reports a series of logis‐
tic regression models, where the dependent variable
is whether the respondent voted in their local elec‐
tion. Respondents were asked: “Did you vote in the
local election last Tuesday in [CITY]?” Possible answers
were “no,” “yes,” “don’t know,” and “refused” (miss‐
ing recoded to not having voted to retain statistical
precision, results robust to alternative coding schemes,
available at request). Each model includes two mea‐
sures of socio‐economic status: Income (1 = less than
$10,000, 9 = greater than $150,000) and Education
(1 = high school graduate or less, 4 = post‐graduate
degree); a variable denoting whether the respondent
is a Female (1 = female, 0 = male); two variables
for race, whether the respondent is Black (1 = Black,
non‐Hispanic, 0 = not Black) or is another race besides
white or Black, non‐Hispanic (Other, 1 = other race,
0 = not another race) with white, non‐Hispanic respon‐
dents as the reference group; a variable denoting ethnic‐
ity (Hispanic, 1 = Hispanic, 0 = non‐Hispanic); two mea‐
sures for partisanship,whether the respondent identifies
as a Democrat (1 = Democrat, 0 = other) or Republican
(1 = Republican, 0 = other), with independents as the
reference group; and a measure of interest in local pol‐
itics (Political Interest, 1 = high interest, 0 = low interest).
To deal with heterogeneity and spatial dependence, each
estimation is computed with robust standard errors clus‐
tered by city. Results are robust to the inclusion of city
fixed effects (available at request). Last, an indicator for
which survey‐year is included to control for potential dif‐
ferences across surveys and years.
Past the basic specifications, we alter each model to
test our hypotheses. Models 2, 4, and 5 include an indi‐
cator for whether the respondent lives in a RCV jurisdic‐
tion (RCV, 1 = RCV city, 0 = plurality city). Models 1 and
2 include a covariate for Age (18–99) and Age Squared
(324–9801). To more precisely test whether RCV elec‐
tions encourage participation of today’s youths, models
3 and 4 swap the covariates of age and age squared
for an indicator variable of whether the respondent is
above/below 35 and model 5 subsamples only those
individuals below the age of 35 as a robustness check.
We use 35 as the age cutoff to capture the genera‐
tional effects that have altered today’s youth participa‐
tion (e.g., their increased political cynicism as a result of
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the negative and hyper‐partisan political circumstances
during their upbringing, as discussed earlier), as well as
to ensure a large enough group of young Americans to
compare to older Americans. This age cutoff captures
all those in the Millennial and Generation Z generations,
with ‘youths’/‘young’ used for brevity to refer to this
group. Additional robustness checks using a continuous
measure of age, using alternative generational cutoffs,
and varying age categories all further support our find‐
ings (see Supplementary File, Appendix B, Tables B1 and
B2, and Figure B1; summary statistics for all variables pre‐
sented in this study are shown in the Supplementary File,
Appendix C, Table C1).
Model 1 in Table 2 acts a baseline voter turnout
model for reference. Model 2 tests whether rank choice
voting elections increase turnout by including a covari‐
ate for whether the election is conducted using RCV. The
coefficient is positive but insignificant at conventional
Table 2. Age, election type, and self‐reported turnout.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Base model RCV Youth + RCV Youth × RCV Youth subsample
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Voted
RCV 0.306 0.331 0.155 0.604**
(0.220) (0.222) (0.218) (0.291)
Youth −1.117*** −1.334***
(0.123) (0.136)




Age Squared −0.001*** −0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.299*** 0.277*** 0.284*** 0.282*** 0.195
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.162)
Female 0.096 0.098 0.085 0.087 0.190
(0.104) (0.103) (0.107) (0.107) (0.184)
Income 0.038 0.041 0.031 0.033 0.055
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.049)
Employed 0.049 0.043 −0.060 −0.061 0.136
(0.144) (0.142) (0.144) (0.144) (0.363)
Black 0.046 0.032 −0.038 −0.041 0.086
(0.158) (0.157) (0.154) (0.156) (0.291)
Asian −0.159 −0.168 −0.312** −0.338** −0.290
(0.149) (0.152) (0.151) (0.153) (0.323)
Other −0.274 −0.280 −0.351 −0.330 −0.852
(0.257) (0.253) (0.229) (0.230) (0.555)
Hispanic −0.163 −0.128 −0.261 −0.244 −0.295
(0.311) (0.308) (0.293) (0.295) (0.407)
Democrat 0.141 0.125 0.186* 0.177 0.275
(0.108) (0.108) (0.110) (0.109) (0.237)
Republican 0.036 0.065 0.125 0.120 0.309
(0.200) (0.200) (0.208) (0.209) (0.537)
Political Interest 1.187*** 1.208*** 1.298*** 1.305*** 1.320***
(0.110) (0.111) (0.114) (0.113) (0.238)
Constant −3.998*** −4.078*** −0.586*** −0.507** −2.041***
(0.388) (0.341) (0.214) (0.216) (0.579)
Observations 4731 4731 4731 4731 473
Notes: Logistic regression with robust and clustered(city) standard errors; * 0.1 ** 0.05 ***0.01. Year fixed effects included but omitted
for space.
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levels, doing little to solve the debate over the partici‐
patory effects of rank choice voting.
Absent any general population effects, we move on
to test our first hypothesis of RCV increasing youth voting.
Model 3 in Table 2 changes the age covariates for an indi‐
cator whether the individual is under 35. Unsurprisingly,
younger individuals are less likely to vote compared
to older individuals (Franklin, 2004). When we interact
whether the respondent is under 35 with whether they
live in an RCV city (model 4), a different story emerges.
Though younger individuals are less likely to vote in both
RCV and non‐RCV cities than older individuals, they are
significantlymore likely to vote in RCV cities compared to
younger individuals in plurality elections. These results
are graphically depicted in Figure 2, which is a coeffi‐
cient plot displaying the probability of voting across elec‐
tion type and age groupwith confidence intervals varying
from 90 to 99 percent levels. The probability of voting
increases from 77 to 86 percent between non‐RCV and
RCV cities for young voters, a difference of nine percent‐
age points. These results are further supported when
we subsample only young voters (model 5). For older
individuals, no statistically significant difference in voting
propensities across election type is found. These results
confirm hypotheses 1 and 2, that younger individuals will
vote more in RCV elections than youths under plurality
elections and gain a larger increase to voting in RCV elec‐
tions than older individuals. With younger voters more
likely to vote in RCV elections, but older individuals not
affected, this evidence also suggests that RCV may work
to lessen the age gap in voter turnout. But are more civil
campaigns and greater candidate contact the forces that
separate youths between RCV and plurality elections, as
theorized here?
To determine the mediational impact of civil cam‐
paigning and candidate contact on the relationship
between youth turnout and preferential voting systems,
this study uses the causal steps approach popularized
by Baron and Kenny (1986). The causal steps approach
uses three equations to establish a mediating relation‐
ship. The first tests for a relationship between the inde‐
pendent variable and the dependent variable (direct
effect) to determine if there exists a relationship to be
mediated. This relationship was established in models 4
and 5 in Table 2. The second tests for a relationship
between the independent variable and the mediator to
establish a mediation pathway. The third equation reex‐
amines the relationship between the independent and
dependent variables while including the mediator vari‐
able, with differences in the effect of the independent
variable assumed to be caused by the mediator variable
(indirect effect). If the effect of the independent variable
is decreased or rendered insignificant, the relationship is
said to partially or fully mediated.
This study uses three proxy measures for campaign
(in)civility—candidate‐to‐candidate criticism, dissatisfac‐
tion with the candidates, and campaign negativity—
and one for campaign contact—whether the respon‐
dent was contacted by a campaign. To measure the
degree of Criticism in the election, respondents were
asked: “Thinking about the [CITY] election, how much
time would you say the candidates spent criticizing their
opponent?” The proposed answers were: “A great deal
of time,” “some of the time,” “not too much,” “not at
all.” The variable is coded so that higher values represent
greater levels of criticism. For Dissatisfaction, respon‐
dents were asked: “How satisfied were you with the






















Plurality × Younger RCV × YoungerRCV × Older
99 95 90
Figure 2. Effect of election type on self‐reported voting. Notes: Estimations of logistic coefficients calculated with all
other variables held at their means/respective values; robust and clustered(city) errors and year fixed effects employed;
90–99 percent confidence intervals shown.
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election?” The proposed answers were: “Very satisfied,”
“fairly satisfied,” “not very satisfied,” “not at all satisfied.”
Voluntary answers were: “No opinion” and “refusal.”
The variable was reverse coded so that higher values rep‐
resent greater Dissatisfaction.
The third measure of campaign civility—
Negativity—is constructed from three related questions.
Respondents were first asked: “Do you believe the cam‐
paigns this year were more negative, less negative, or
about the same compared to other recent political con‐
tests?” The proposed answers were: “more,” “less,”
and “about the same.” Two follow‐up questions were
asked: “Was it a lot more negative, or just a little more
negative?” and “Was it a lot less negative, or a just a
little less negative?” Their options were: “a lot” and
“a little.” Respondents could also respond “don’t know”
and “refuse.” Because few respondents reported the
election being a lot less(more) negative, answers were
coded into a single variable ranging from Less Negative,
About the Same,More Negative, with higher values rep‐
resenting more negativity. Results are robust to using
the five‐point version that results from distinguishing
between those who saw elections are somewhat and a
lot less(more) negative (available upon request).
The measure of campaign contact is derived from
a question that asked: “During the recent local elec‐
tion, did a candidate or anyone from a local city
campaign contact you to persuade you how to vote
either by phone, mail, in person or over the Internet?”
Respondents could answer “yes” or “no,” or volunteer
“don’t know” or “refusal.” The question asks whether a
candidate/campaign contacted the respondent by any
of the above means to persuade them how to vote.
To the extent that respondents were contacted for non‐
vote‐persuasion reasons (e.g., direct mobilization with‐
out attempting to change the voters intended vote
choice) and answered no on the contact question, this
potentially biases the study against finding any effects
of contact. Contacted voters are more likely to vote
(Gerber &Green, 2000; Rosenstone&Hansen, 2003). If a
voter is contacted for non‐persuasion reasons, answered
“no” for contact due to it asking about persuasion
of vote choice, but still voted, the result will be an
under‐estimation of the effect of candidate contact on
voter turnout.
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the causal
steps approach. In each table, the first model repli‐
cates model 4 from Table 2 for reference of the effect
Table 3. Age, election type, and self‐reported turnout: The roles of civility and contact (1/2).
1 2 3 4 5
Base model Predicting Predicting turnout Predicting Predicting turnout
perceived controlling for perceived controlling for
criticism perceived criticism dissatisfaction perceived
dissatisfaction
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
RCV 0.155 −0.431 0.245 −0.066 0.096
(0.218) (0.275) (0.220) (0.333) (0.217)
Youth −1.334*** 0.192 −1.323*** −0.178 −1.332***
(0.136) (0.135) (0.151) (0.184) (0.135)
Youth × RCV 0.445* 0.224 0.503** 0.281 0.487**
(0.230) (0.143) (0.235) (0.262) (0.211)
Criticism of other candidates 0.134**
(0.067)
Satisfaction of campaign −0.195***
(0.069)
Controls √ √ √ √ √
Constant −0.507** −0.635** 0.095
(0.216) (0.289) (0.325)
Constant −0.655* −1.444***
Cut 1 (0.376) (0.501)
Constant 0.490 1.070**
Cut 2 (0.361) (0.507)
Constant 2.058*** 2.623***
Cut 3 (0.489) (0.581)
Observations 4731 4338 4338 4505 4505
Notes: Logistic (models 1, 3, and 5) and ordered logistic regression (models 2 and 4) with robust and clustered(city) standard errors.
* 0.1 ** 0.05 ***0.01. Year/survey fixed effects employed. Control variables omitted to save space.
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Table 4. Age, election type, and self‐reported turnout: The roles of civility and contact (2/2).
1 2 3 4 5
Base model Predicting Predicting turnout Predicting Predicting turnout
perceived controlling for mobilization controlling for
negativity perceived negativity mobilization
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
main
RCV 0.155 −1.040*** 0.111 0.076 0.117
(0.218) (0.339) (0.203) (0.237) (0.190)
Youth −1.334*** −0.367** −1.352*** −0.773*** −1.246***
(0.136) (0.164) (0.139) (0.182) (0.153)
Youth × RCV 0.445* 0.708*** 0.473** 0.555** 0.370





Controls √ √ √ √ √
Constant −0.507** −0.149 −0.798*** −0.822***





Observations 4731 4731 4731 4689 4689
Notes: Logistic (models 1, 3, and 5) and ordered logistic regression (models 2 and 4) with robust and clustered(city) standard errors.
* 0.1 ** 0.05 ***0.01. Year/survey fixed effects employed. Control variables omitted to save space.
of RCV on youth voting behavior. Following this, each
subsequent model either tests whether RCV is related
to the mediating variables (models 2 and 4 in both
tables) or how the inclusion of the mediator affects
the relationship between RCV and youth voting (mod‐
els 3 and 5 in both tables). In the models predicting
the relationship between RCV and the respondent’s per‐
ception of candidate‐candidate criticism, campaign neg‐
ativity, and their dissatisfaction with candidates, ordered
logistic regression is used given the dependent variables
of Criticism and Satisfaction range from 1 to 4, and
Negativity ranges from 1 to 3 (results robust to the use of
ordinary least squares regression and multinomial logis‐
tic regression, available upon request). The models that
predict turnout controlling for the different mediators
use logistic regression, as does the model predicting can‐
didate contact. Otherwise, all model specifications are
the same as used in Table 2. For space concerns, con‐
trol variables are omitted (see Tables B3.1 and B3.2 in
Appendix B, Supplementary File).
Starting with Table 3, the interactions between resid‐
ing in an RCV jurisdiction and being under the age
of 35 are not significantly related to feelings of criti‐
cism (model 2) or dissatisfaction (model 4), suggesting
younger voters do not perceive more criticism or dissat‐
isfaction than older votes in RCV elections or younger
voters in plurality areas, as well as suggesting a lack
of a mediation pathway. Controlling for level of criti‐
cism (model 3) and dissatisfaction (model 5) increases
the effects of RCV elections on youth voting, though by
unsubstantial amounts.
The last measure of campaign civility, campaign neg‐
ativity, is reported in models 2 and 3 in Table 4. Unlike
the previous measures, the interaction term is statisti‐
cally significant, suggesting a relationship between RCV
elections, young or old voters, and perceptions of cam‐
paign negativity. Further analyses reveal that young vot‐
ers do not change their perceptions of campaign nega‐
tivity across election jurisdictions. However, older voters
find RCV elections less negative, though by an unsub‐
stantial amount, providing some evidence against the
argument that the more civil nature of RCV elections
may be attracting young voters (see Supplementary File,
Appendix B, Figure B2). Does negativity moderate the
relationship between election type, age, and voting?
Model 3, which includes the interaction term and the
measure of campaign negativity to predict voter turnout,
suggests not. The covariate for negativity is statistically
insignificant and the relationship between the interac‐
tion term and the dependent variable is strengthened.
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Why is the relationship of interest related to campaign
negativity, but negativity does not mediate the rela‐
tionship? Further analyses reveal that negativity is not
related to the likelihood one votes in the elections under
study (see Supplementary File, Appendix B, Tables B4
and B5). The evidence presented thus far suggests that
increased civility in RCV elections does not account for
increased youth voting in RCV elections.
Besides campaign civility, RCV elections have also
been found to have increased contact efforts (Bowler et
al., 2003). Is this increased contact leading more youths
to the polls in RCV localities? Model 4 in Table 4 sug‐
gests that there may be relationship between RCV elec‐
tions, young or old voters, and increased campaign con‐
tact. Young voters are twelve percentage points more
likely to be contacted if they reside in an RCV jurisdic‐
tion than youths in plurality areas, while no significant
effect was found for older voters (see Supplementary
File, Appendix B, Figure B3). Does this increased youth
contact account for increased youth voting?Model 5 sug‐
gests that campaign contact may substantially reduce
the relationship between RCV elections, young vot‐
ers, and voter turnout. The interaction coefficient has
decreased by nearly 17 percent and is now insignificant,
while the contact covariate is statistically significant. This
suggests that mobilization may account for a substantial
portion of the increased youth turnout in RCV elections.
Though popular, the causal step approach has been
criticized as a procedure for establishing mediation, par‐
tially due to its strong but untested assumptions and
difficulties being extended to non‐linear models (Imai,
Keele, Tingley, & Yamamoto, 2011). As an additional
robustness check, models were re‐estimated using the
non‐parametric approach established by Imai and col‐
leagues (e.g., Imai et al., 2011). This approach allows for
the total effect of RCV to be decomposed into its direct
(X→ Y) and indirect (X→mediator→ Y) effects, as well
as sensitivity analyses to be conducted. Results (reported
in the Supplementary File, Appendix B, Table B6 and
Figure B4) support the conclusion that only candidate
contact mediates the relationship between RCV elec‐
tions and increased youth turnout. The inclusion of
the candidate contact covariate renders the interaction
insignificant and, according to the decomposed RCV total
effect, the indirect effect of RCV through candidate con‐
tact is roughly 12 percent of the full effect.
As additional robustness checks, all models from
Tables 3 and 4 (and Table B6 in Appendix B) were
re‐estimated subsampling only those respondents under
the age of 35 (see the Supplementary File, Appendix B,
Tables B7.1 and B8, and Figure B5). Results strongly
support the evidence provided here. There is no rela‐
tionship between young voters, RCV elections, and can‐
didate criticism or dissatisfaction with the candidates.
Additionally, there is no link between campaign negativ‐
ity and RCV elections. However, young voters in RCV elec‐
tions are more likely to be contacted by candidates or
campaigns than youths in plurality elections. Controlling
for candidate contact reduces the RCV coefficient by
nearly a third, though it remains statistically significant
(p = 0.075). Further analyses using the non‐parametric
approach suggest the indirect effect of RCV through con‐
tact accounts for nearly a quarter of the total effect of
RCV elections on youth voting. These results underscore
the importance of candidate contact onmobilizing young
voters in RCV elections.
6. Summary and Conclusion
Current literature suggests that preferential elections are
less negative, with candidates less likely to criticize their
opponents, more likely to reach out to voters, and citi‐
zens more likely to approve of campaigns (Bowler et al.,
2003; Donovan et al., 2016; McGinn, 2020). At the same
time, younger citizens are less likely to participate in poli‐
tics due to their pessimistic political attitude and low lev‐
els of engagement (Dalton, 2015; Lawless & Fox, 2015).
Can RCV elections be the uplifting and mobilizing force
young individuals need to push them into voting? The evi‐
dence presented here suggests so.
Comparing self‐reported turnout between preferen‐
tial and plurality cities matched on important demo‐
graphics, we find strong evidence that younger individu‐
als aremore likely to vote in RCV cities compared to their
younger counterparts in plurality cities. Further, the age
gap in voting is much smaller in RCV cities, suggesting
that RCV has the potential to decrease age inequality in
the American electorate.
When it comes to why RCV elections motivate young
voters to hit the booths,we find little support for any civil‐
ity effects but strong support for potential mobilization
effects. Little differences in perceived campaign civility
were found, but young voters are significantlymore likely
to be contacted by a candidate/campaign than younger
individuals in plurality cities. Further analyses reveal that
candidate contact accounts for a substantial portion of
the effect of RCV elections on youth voting, suggesting
that increased candidate contact is a contributing factor
behind increased youth voting in RCV elections. Last, it is
worthmentioning that, across all models, the probability
of older individuals voting rarely changes by more than a
percentage point and is never statistically different from
the probability of voting in plurality elections, providing
further evidence that these effects may be more impact‐
ful on younger Americans.
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